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THE NEW TAX POLICY ON DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
Ralph S. Rice* 
N o single factor of income tax planning today exceeds in im-portance those devices under which payment of tax with 
respect to services performed by an employee in his peak earning 
years is postponed until the compensation is actually paid to him 
at a later date. It is normally expected that through these devices 
payment will be made to the employee after he has partially or 
fully retired and no longer encounters the high tax burden which 
arises from progressive rates at the time the services are rendered. 
The several ways in which income of an employee may be 
deferred through cooperation with employers may be recounted 
briefly. Extensive statutes deal with the very desirable device of 
deferring employee compensation (and permitting its receipt at 
capital gain rates) through pension, profit-sharing and stock bonus 
plans.1 Employee compensation may be deferred and in addition 
made available at capital gains rates through use of stock option 
plans.2 Deferred compensation (payable, however, to employee's 
dependents rather than the employee himself) also may be avail-
able under so-called widows' benefit3 plans and split dollar in-
surance.4 
The simplest method of spreading employment income, how-
ever, arises where an employer simply makes an agreement with 
an employee to postpone payment of salary to him until a subse-
quent date. This device is most desirable where the employee is on 
a cash basis; an employee on the accrual basis would have income 
under Treasury regulations, sections 1.446-1 (c) (ii) and 1.451-1 (a) 
when the fact of the employer's liability became fixed, and the 
amount was set. Since a great majority of taxpayers use the cash 
basis in making tax returns with respect to their income as em-
ployees, this limitation does not seriously restrict use of the device. 
Deferred compensation arrangements of this nature have some 
disadvantages over other devices. However, they also have sub-
stantial advantages not afforded through other means. As distin-
guished from so-called "qualified" pension, profit-sharing, and stock 
bonus plans, informal deferred compensation arrangements can 
l INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 401-404, 501. 
2Jd., § 421. 
8 Id., § IOI (b) (I). 
4 Rev. Rul. 55-7Ill, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 2ll. 
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be made with employees selected at the will of the employer. Un-
der an informal deferred compensation plan, discrimination of 
any kind or character between employees thus is allowable pro-
vided only that total compensation paid each employee is reason-
able within the intendment of Internal Revenue Code, section 162. 
While there is thus very little limitation on the amount payable to 
a single employee through informal deferred compensation (in-
cluding employees who in Hollywood idiom are in the "son-in-law 
business"), such a limitation does exist as to formal pension and 
profit-sharing plans. Many employers have a pension plan appli-
cable to all employees within a group, but desire to offer addi-
tional informal deferred compensation arrangements to a limited 
number of executives whose need for ( or ability to command) de-
ferment exceeds that of the general group. In addition, deferred 
compensation arrangements of course are effective as to the em-
ployee himself rather than his dependents; hence they are obviously 
more desirable in many cases than benefits for dependents. Finally, 
the employer gets a deduction for compensation paid under proper 
deferred compensation arrangements; in this and other respects 
informal deferred compensation is more desirable than stock option 
plans. 
Thus, the freedom of informal deferred compensation plans 
has been most attractive to tax counselors. However, the courts 
and the Commissioner have in years past been so vague about the 
scope of the device that many have, in terrorem, been extremely 
cautious in using it. In February 1960, however, the Commissioner 
clarified his position very considerably by the issuance of Revenue 
Ruling 60-31.5 Because of the importance of this device in tax 
planning and the scope of the ruling, it is desirable now to review: 
I. The circumstances in which and the extent to which 
tax savings through informal deferred compensation arrange-
ments are currently allowable, and 
2. The practical effect of the ruling and its place in cur-
rent legislative and administrative structures for the taxation 
of income. 
It has always been necessary to approach informal deferred 
payment plans with caution; otherwise bunching of income may 
result. For example, where a taxpayer leaving a corporate em-
ployer is given funds from a non-qualified profit-sharing trust, all 
5 1960-5 INT. REv. Buu.. p. 17. 
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the sums he receives are considered ordinary income to him in 
the year of receipt.6 The same is true of other separation payments,7 
particularly where cancellation of an employment contract is in-
volved.8 This should be avoided since bunched income invites 
progressive rates of tax. 
Doctrines Which Restrict Deferred Compensation Arrangements: 
"Economic Benefit" and "Constructive Receipt" 
Courts commenting on deferred compensation arrangements 
have sometimes expressed their views in terms of a so-called "eco-
nomic benefit" doctrine. This is a grandiose way of saying that 
income will be attributed to a taxpayer who is on the cash basis 
even though he receives something besides cash.9 That is, if a 
taxpayer is paid in potatoes or typewriters, income will be attrib-
uted to him to the extent of the fair market value of these items 
when he receives them. Cases in this area become quite difficult 
6 Frazer v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1946). 
7 A substantial numerical preponderance of the cases attribute income to an employee 
who receives a lump sum when he leaves the employment of another. This is for the 
reason that the courts feel that the payments are really motivated by past services and on 
this basis must be treated as compensation. See for example, Carragan v. Commissioner, 
197 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1952); Chauncey L. Landon, 16 B.T.A. 907 (1929); Beatty's Estate, 
7 B.T .A. 726 (1927). The item is more likely to be treated as income if it is found that 
the amount of payment is measured by the salary of the recipient. Willkie v. Commis-
sioner, 127 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1942); Chauncey L. Landon, supra. Perhaps the courts are 
simply looking for unguarded language in contemporaneous records such as corporation 
minutes and correspondence, but it must be noted that great emphasis is placed upon the 
language in which the transaction is couched. Such phrases as "in recognition" and "in 
appreciation" or references to "obligation," "remuneration" and "salary" have been used 
in attributing income. See Willkie v. Commissioner, supra; Botchford v. Commissioner, 
81 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1936); Walker, 25 T.C. 832 (1956); James H. Anderson, 31 B.T.A. 
197 (1934), aff'd per curiam, 79 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1935); Arthur L. Lougee, 26 B.T .A. 23 
(1932). Compare, however, Cunningham v. Commissioner, 67 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1933). 
Reference is also made to the fact that the employer making the payment deducted it as 
an expense; this is especially fatal if the employer charged it to a salary account. See 
Botchford v. Commissioner, supra; Fisher v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1932); 
James H. Anderson, supra; Arthur L. Lougee, supra; Robert E. Binger, 22 B.T.A. Ill 
(1931); Willis L. Garey, 16 B.T .A. 274 (1929). Compare N. H. Van Sicklen, Jr., 33 B.T .A. 
544 (1935). In an early case, a listing of a payment of a gift was thought to preclude its 
attribution as salary to an employee. Estate of Daly, 3 B.T .A. 1042 (1926). However, this 
is certainly not the law in the Second Circuit (or probably elsewhere) today. Carragan v. 
Commissioner, supra. Similarly, emphasis has been placed in these cases (as well as in 
others discussed in previous paragraphs) upon the fact that the governing body of the 
enterprise making the payment had no authority to make a gift. James H. Anderson, 
supra; Bcatty's Estate, supra. 
8 F. W. Jessop, 16 T.C. 491 (1951); Charles J. Williams, 5 T.C. 639 (1945); George K. 
Gann, 41 B.T.A. 388 (1940); Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T .A. 108 (1936). 
o Treas. Reg. § I.446-1 (a)(3) (1957); W. P. Henritze, 41 B.T .A. 505 (1940) (semble). 
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to distinguish. For example, notes10 and checks11 have been held 
to constitute income. On the other hand, it appears clear that "A 
mere promise to pay, not represented by notes or secured in any 
way, is not regarded as a receipt of income within the intendment 
of the cash receipts and disbursements method."12 
Consequently, it is clear that some kinds of "economic benefits" 
are included in measuring the taxpayer's income, while other kinds 
are not. There is no way of telling in advance what will or will 
not be treated as income except on the basis of the decided cases; 
the enterprise for the taxpayer is the familiar one of drawing a line 
between an unsecured promise to pay money (which creates no 
income to a cash basis taxpayer) and a promise which is made in 
the form of a note or other evidence of the indebtedness (which 
10 Where a note is given by a corporation to an employee and the evidence shows 
that it is intended as compensation rather than mere evidence of indebtedness, the note 
may represent taxable income. Schlemmer v. United States, 94 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1938). 
See also Cherokee Motor Coach Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1943). 
But even in the absence of an intention to compensate, it is the position of the Com-
missioner that "notes or other evidences of indebtedness received in payment for services 
constitute income in the amount of their fair market value at the time of the transfer." 
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2 (d) (4) (1957). See also Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
164 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1947). 
It should be noted that while receipt of a note may create taxable income, merely 
giving of a note does not represent payment so as to authorize a deduction by a taxpayer 
on the cash basis: he has, of course, actually paid nothing in cash. Helvering v. Price, 309 
U.S. 409 (1940). 
11 A leading case is Lavery v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1946), in which 
a taxpayer received a check on December 30 and cashed it on the succeeding January 2. 
It was held to be income to him on December 30 on the basis of a predecessor to Treas. 
Reg. § 1.451-2 (a) (1957). The terms of the earlier regulation did not differ substantially 
from the present one. The court held that the receipt of the check was equivalent to the 
receipt of cash since the taxpayer could have cashed it on the day it was received by him, 
or at least on December 31. There was no doubt about the validity of the check or the 
solvency of the drawer. The Tax Court has gone farther and held that even where a 
check was received after banking hours on December 31 it was income in the year received. 
Charles F. Kahler, 18 T.C. 31 (1952). Moreover, it has been held that a dividend check 
represents income when it is issued if it is mailed on December 31, where the stockholder 
can pick it up at the office and instead requests that it be mailed to him. Frank Vv. Kunze, 
19 T.C. 29 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 203 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1953). On the other hand, if the 
practice is to put the checks in the mail on December 31 and the recipient could not get 
it in any event until the next year it has been held that the payment is not income to 
him until the next year. Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 210 (1934). See also, W. A. 
Sloper, 1 T.C. 746 (1943). Compare, however, McEuen v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 127 (5th 
Cir. 1952). 
12 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-5 INT. REv. Buu..., p. 17 citing United States v. Christine Oil 
& Gas Co., 269 Fed. 458 (W .D.La. 1920); Jackson v. Smietanka, 272 Fed. 970 (7th Cir. 1921) 
and E. F. Cremin, 5 B.T.A. 1164 (1927). 
T~e case of C. Fl?rian Zittel, 12 B.T .A. 675 (1928) is also cited in the ruling, the 
f~llowmg languag~ bemg qu_?ted from the opin~on: "Taxpayers on a cash receipts and 
d~sb~rsements basJS are required to report only mcome actually received no matter how 
bmdmg any contract they may have to receive more." However, it is doubtful that a rule 
so broadly stated currently represents the law; certainly the Service would not agree to it. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957). 
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may be said to convey an economic benefit which is the equivalent 
of cash and hence to be taxable as income when made to a cash 
basis taxpayer). 
A second concept much discussed in deferred compensation 
cases concerns constructive receipt. In general the rule may be 
stated to be that where a taxpayer can reach out and take income 
for himself, and fails to do so, he will be treated for income tax 
purposes as though he had in fact taken it. The ramifications of 
this doctrine are too general to be discussed here. However, it is 
necessary to examine the doctrine to the extent that it applies to 
arrangements under which compensation is deferred pursuant to 
contractual arrangements between employer and employee. It may 
be noted initially that the regulations require income to be attrib-
uted to a taxpayer in the year in which it is either actually or con-
structively received.13 
The basic theory respecting the constructive receipt doctrine 
in deferred income cases is illustrated by the new Revenue Ruling 
which furnishes the occasion for these comments.14 As a prelimi-
nary, we should consider the recital in the regulations that: 
"Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's 
possession is constructively received by him in the taxable 
year during which it is credited to his account or set apart for 
him so that he may draw upon it at any time."15 
This is interpreted in the Revenue Ruling in the following 
terms: 
"Thus, under the doctrine of constructive receipt, a tax-
payer may not deliberately turn his back upon income and 
thereby select the year for which he will report it .... Nor may 
a taxpayer, by a private agreement, postpone receipt of in-
come from one taxable year to another .... " 
This general admonition is not, however, given substantial 
effect in the specific examples considered. Indeed the ruling sig-
nificantly expands the usefulness of informal deferred compensa-
tion devices in cases where it had previously been thought neces-
sary to impose some condition which the employee would be 
required to fulfill before deferred compensation could be paid to 
him. 
13 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-1 (a) and 1.446-1 (c) (I) (i) (1957) • 
14 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-5 INT. REv. BuL., p. 17. 
llS Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (a) (1957). 
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The regulations have for many years provided in part that 
·•income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of 
its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions."16 
Pursuant to this rule, a number of devices providing for conditions 
(often purely formal) on receipt of deferred compensation became 
common.11 To put the problem in the context of a cash basis 
taxpayer, the theory here was that he would in fact receive no cash 
when his services were rendered and that the doctrine of construc-
tive receipt could scarcely be extended to apply to situations in 
which his right to receive payments of a measurable value at a 
specific time was conditional rather than absolute. Such deferred 
compensation arrangements reflected a variety of contingency 
clauses. A favorite among them was the requirement that the em-
ployee should, after formal retirement, render services as a consult-
ant in return for which payments in the sum stated would be made. 
A similar requirement was that the employee after his term of 
employment should not enter into a competing employment with 
another or compete as a sole trader or partner. Other conditions 
included making the compensation contingent upon his total in-
come upon retirement, or the length of time the employee was 
employed by the employer, or the financial ability of the employer 
to pay after retirement. (The last qualifications particularly are 
directed toward reducing the rights of the employee for commercial 
as well as tax reasons. It is clear that many of them will be retained 
for commercial purposes in the future, even where not required 
for tax savings.) 
The Effect of the Ruling on Concept of Constructive Receipt 
The effect of such limitations has been sharply limited under 
Example 1 of Revenue Ruling 60-31. In that example the Com-
missioner considered circumstances in which an employee under 
contract received a stipulated annual salary and additional com-
pensation credited to a bookkeeping reserve account. The latter 
amount was to be deferred, accumulated, and paid in annual in-
stallments upon retirement of the employee. The agreement re-
cited that the money was not intended to be held in trust by the 
employer for the employee. The payments were not conditioned 
upon the performance of consultative or other services, agreements 
16Ibid. 
17 These appeared to be supported by such cases as Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 
711 (7th Cir. 1953); Fred C. Hall, 15 T.C. 195 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 538 (9th 
Cir. 1952); Harry B. Sidles, 19 T.C. 1114 (1953); Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947). 
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not to compete, or the like. It was held that the deferred income 
was taxable to the employee only when actually received; the de-
vice was successful. Hence the existence of conditions on payment 
of the deferred compensation appears no longer imperative to 
insure that they will not be taxed to an employee on the cash basis 
before actual receipt. 
There has been a semantic variation of the concept of condi-
tional deferments. One comment frequently made with respect 
to deferred compensation agreements in the past has been that the 
rights of an employee to deferred compensation could not be vested 
but must be forfeitable; otherwise the employee must be deemed 
to have received income in the year in which he performed the 
services out of which deferred compensation was subsequently to 
arise. It is thought appropriate to mention this factor, although 
reflection will reveal that references to whether the interest of the 
employee is forfeitable really constitute only a restatement of the 
rule that control of the receipt of deferred income must be "subject 
to substantial limitations or restrictions," as suggested at section 
1.451-2 (a) of the Treasury regulations, or constructive receipt will 
be attributed to the employee at the time he originally renders 
services. It must be assumed that this earlier requirement is no 
longer law but is rejected also by the specific conclusion in the 
Revenue Ruling that the arrangements discussed in Example I 
were effective even where no conditions were imposed with respect 
to payment of the deferred compensation. 
The language of other opinions in the past has suggested that 
one factor in attributing deferred income to an employee during 
the year in which he performed services was that the employee 
might in fact have been able to induce the employer to make pay-
ment during that year rather than at a later date. It might be argued 
that this basic philosophy is a part of the constructive receipt con-
cept; that is, that the employee could have gotten the property at 
an earlier time if he so desired. The ruling lays this requirement 
to rest.18 
18 It is made abundantly clear in the ruling that the possibility that the payor would 
have been willing to agree to an earlier payment is irrelevant; the case of J. D. Amend, 
13 T.C. 178 (1949) is cited. However, C. E. Gullett, 31 B.T.A. 1067, 1069 (1935) is 
quoted to the following effect: "It is clear that the doctrine of constructive receipt is to 
be sparingly used; that amounts due from a corporation but unpaid, are not to be in-
cluded in the income of an individual reporting his income on a cash receipts basis 
unless it appears that the money was available to him, that the corporation was able and 
ready to pay him, that his right to receive was not restricted, and that his failure to receive 
resulted from exercise of his own choice." The effect of the last clause is not clear; 
presumably it is not intended to qualify the general rule stated elsewhere in the ruling. 
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It is now likewise clear that in some cases future payments for 
past earnings may be deferred. As all students of the subject know, 
the leading case in this area is Commissioner v. Oates,19 in which 
an insurance agent had retired from active service with an insur-
ance company. He was entitled to renewal commissions, of which 
he was to receive a disproportionately large sum during his first 
year. He and other agents agreed with the company that these 
payments should be deferred to subsequent years. The payments 
arose from policies sold (that is, in effect, services rendered) prior 
to the time that the agreement with the company was renegotiated 
to provide for deferred income. It was held that the arrangements 
for deferred income should be given effect for tax purposes and 
that the agent should not be held to have had constructive receipt 
of premiums pursuant to the terms of the agreement which he 
originally entered into with the company but rather should be 
treated as receiving income on a deferred basis pursuant to the 
subsequent arrangement. 
On the basis of the Oates decision, tax counsel in some cases 
subsequently permitted clients, after services had been rendered, 
to change previous arrangements which would have lumped re-
tirement or other income into a single year. The objective of the 
change was to insure that payment would be spread, on a deferred 
basis. However, since the Internal Revenue Service had non-
acquiesced in the decision, some counsel thought that this pro-
cedure carried with it substantial dangers. This non-acquiescence 
was withdrawn correlative with the issuance of the ruling. 
What does the withdrawal of the non-acquiescence signify? It 
does not, of course, mean that a taxpayer will in all cases be given 
carte blanche to make deferred compensation arrangements after 
income has actually been earned but before it has been received 
by a cash basis taxpayer. The only thing that can be presumed 
to be established is that where deferment of receipts for past serv-
ices follows the pattern of the Oates case, the deferred compensation 
arrangement will not be attacked by the Commissioner.2° For 
example, consider circumstances in which the spreading arrange-
ments (in a case otherwise like Oates) were not entered into until 
19 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953). 
20 The Commissioner here appears to have gone farther toward taxpayer indulgence 
than some cases would have required. The fact that parties have changed an earlier 
arrangement for compensation to suit their tax convenience has been the occasion for 
critical judicial comment in cases where tax avoidance devices have been stricken down. 
Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955); George W. Drysdale, 32 T.C. 378 
(1959). 
1961 ] DEFERRED COMPENSATION 389 
after a right to the renewal commissions had crystallized so that the 
taxpayer could take down the payments at any time in his sole 
discretion. Certainly there is no assurance that such an arrange-
ment would not be successfully attacked by the Commissioner and 
income attributed to the taxpayer in accordance with the original 
agreement. Indeed there is great likelihood that the agreement 
would be so contested. 
Effect of Ruling on Deferment Devices for Entrepreneurs and 
Professional Persons 
Cases and rulings authorizing deferment of compensation have 
not thus far been extended to business profits of independent en-
terpreneurs such as brokers, professional men and others engaged 
in business enterprises. Apparently taxpayers have feared at-
tempting to extend informal deferred compensation this far. The 
wisdom of this restraint is emphasized by the ruling. In the fifth 
example there discussed a boxer, his opponent, and a boxing club 
agreed to stage an exhibition. An arrangement was made that one 
boxer (taxpayer) was to receive approximately sixteen percent of 
the gross receipts. However, his share of the gross receipts was to 
be held by the boxing club and spread through payments to the 
taxpayer over a period of four years. The ruling recited that all 
of the income to be paid to the boxer was attributable to him in the 
year it was earned because the boxer was not an employee of the 
boxing club. On the contrary, his share of the gross receipts from 
the match belonged to him and never belonged to the club. 
Certainly the same rule would be applicable in any case in-
volving a joint venturer in a business enterprise where the funds 
are held by one joint venturer in an attempt to defer income to the 
other. However, as noted in the succeeding paragraph, an excep-
tion is made in the regulation for cases involving authors; this 
raises a question respecting whether the same rule would apply 
where a payor (e.g., a client) deferred payment to several joint 
venturers (e.g., an associated group of independent attorneys). 
This question is not resolved. 
Special Benefits from Deferred Compensation Agreements 
Permitted to Authors 
Tax advantages are also made available under certain circum-
stances in which an author sells publication rights for his book. In 
Example 3 discussed in the ruling, specific royalties based on cash 
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received from sales of copies of the work were agreed upon be-
tween author and publisher. In a separate agreement the parties 
agreed that notwithstanding the first contract, the publisher would 
not pay more than a stated amount per year to the author. Sums 
earned in excess of that amount during the year would be carried 
over by the publisher into a succeeding accounting period and 
thereafter paid; he was not required to pay interest on such sums 
or to segregate them in any manner. 
The Commissioner ruled that the author was not required to 
report income in the year in which the royalty payments were 
earned, but only in the year in which they were to be received. 
Emphasis was placed upon the following factors: (1) The two 
agreements should be read as one, and (2) the agreement was made 
before the royalties were earned. 
It was ruled that this arrangement could not be distinguished 
from the one (Example I of the ruling) in which tax deferment 
was authorized where an employer agreed to make additional salary 
payments to an employee at a period of time commencing five years 
after services were rendered by the latter. 
Deferment Devices May Not Be Supported by 
Security Arrangements 
Prior to the adoption of Revenue Ruling 60-31, courts had 
concluded that amounts paid into a trust which was not a "quali-
fied" pension trust but was created in order to provide for de-
ferred payments to a recipient employee were taxable to him when 
the amounts were paid over since they were "irrevocably paid out" 
for his "sole benefit." This is because the use of this device to in-
sure that payment is ultimately made to the employee actually 
represents a constructive receipt by him.21 This view is also in-
corporated in the statute.22 
21 E. T. Sproull, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), afj'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952); 
David W. Anderson, 5 T.C. 1317 (1945); K. R. Kingsbury, 31 B.T.A. 1126 (1935). 
This problem was considered also in George W. Drysdale, 32 T.C. 378 (1959) where 
an employer paid funds to a trustee for the benefit of certain employees who had non• 
forfeitable rights in the trust. The taxpayer contended that in order to receive the pay-
ments he was required to render consulting services, but the trust did not provide that 
on a forfeiture by the employee the funds would return to the employer. In a somewhat 
unsatisfactory decision it was held that the payments should nevertheless be attributed to 
the employee when paid to the trustee by the employer rather than the later date when 
sums were paid by the trustee to the employee. The basis for the holding is not altogether 
clear, although it is said that " .•. the employment contract was fully executed as far as 
the years in issue are concerned ... " and that "the Detroit Trust Company was simply 
petitioner's designated agent." 
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No statute requires this result where payment is made in 
escrow, but it has been assumed that the Commissioner would 
claim that the taxpayer constructively received such payments, and 
the ruling confirms this view. At Example 4, the question was 
asked whether a football player realized immediate income from a 
bonus paid by his employer to an escrow agent, subsequent pay-
ments thereafter to be made by the agent to the player over a 
period of five years, plus interest on the principal amount. In the 
event of the football player's death, the proceeds were to be pay-
able to his estate. It was ruled that the amounts placed in escrow 
were income to the football player in the year in which they were 
placed in escrow, rather than the year in which he actually received 
them. 
This result is consistent with decisions in related areas. For 
example, where payment has been made to a commercial insurance 
company for an annuity on behalf of an employee whose rights in 
the annuity are fixed, payment by the employer represents income 
to the employee in the year in which payment was made.23 Of 
course, the rights of the employee to the annuity would have to be 
fixed in order to create constructive receipt of income to him.24 
An employer who pays sums into a non-forfeitable trust or 
annuity may have a deduction for this amount when it is paid even 
if no formal pension or profit-sharing arrangement has been 
made.25 However, this is really irrelevant from the standpoint of 
the objectives of informal deferred compensation since the device 
fails where payments are taxed to the employee when made by 
the employer. 
The holding of the case is likewise unclear, although on the facts presented the result 
is apparent. Income will be attributed to employees when an employer pays funds into a 
trust in which the right of the employees are forfeitable, as long as the employer has no 
right to recapture the funds and the trustee acts as the agent of the employee. A simple 
statement of that result reflects the imponderables in the decision. For example: 
I. Under what circumstances may a trustee of deferred compensation payments be 
said to be the agent of the employee rather than the employer? 
2. Where the rights of an employee to deferred compensation from any fund are 
conditional, how can it be said that he has received income when another pays sums into 
the fund, merely because the payer has not parted with dominion? 
The test of income to the employee ought to be based on his right to the funds, not 
whether employer has given up all right to them. 
22 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 402 (b). 
23 It is assumed that the annuity is not "qualified" for the tax advantages of INT. R.Ev. 
CODE of 1954, § 401 ff. United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950); Hackett v. 
Commissioner, 159 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1946); Hubbell v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 516 (6th 
Cir. 1941'); Oberwinder v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1945); Renton K. Brodie, 
I T.C. 275 (1942). INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 403 (b). 
24 Ibid. 
2G See, for example, Treas. Reg. § I.404 (a)-12 (1956). 
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It is thoroughly evident that taxpayers planning deferred com-
pensation arrangements other than formal pension, annuity and 
profit-sharing trusts under Internal Revenue Code, section 40 I ff. 
should studiously avoid current payments into trusts, or in escrow 
or for annuities ori behalf of employees. This aspect of previous 
law has not been changed by the ruling. 
Deferred Income Arrangements May Protect Employee Against 
Inflationary Pressures 
It has been noted that in the usual case a deferred compensa-
tion arrangement will require that the employer pay a certain sum 
of dollars to or for the benefit of the employee at a subsequent 
period of time. This may be undesirable to an employee who 
fears inflation and desires to get the purchasing equivalent in (for 
example) 1975 of dollars earned from services rendered in 1961. 
He may, for example, prefer to have the dollars otherwise owed 
to him in 1961 put into common stock so that he can get the 
advantage of what he expects to be a rise in the market by 1975. 
(Employees can be protected in this respect under pension plans 
which qualify for advantages of the tax treatment of Internal 
Revenue Code, section 401 and following statutes. However, for 
the reasons noted at the beginning of these comments, often an 
employer cannot or does not want to set up such a trust, perhaps 
because he does not want to make the plan available to an entire 
group of employees.) 
For the reasons described in preceding paragraphs, the em-
ployer cannot put money into a trust for the employee where in-
formal deferred compensation arrangements are desired. If he 
does so and the rights of the employee are forfeitable, a deduction 
would be denied to the employer,26 as it would likewise be denied 
if he had invested in an annuity.27 If the money were put in trust, 
the payment would be attributed to the employee immediately 
when it was paid out by the employer.28 Obviously, this is the 
very worst planning. 
In order to avoid these contingencies, it has been suggested 
that an employer enter into an arrangement with an employee 
whereby he agrees to pay him at a future date the equivalent to 
the value of a stated number of shares of a named stock. At the 
26 Under INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 404 (a) (5). 
27 Ibid. 
28Jd., § 403(c) 
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time the agreement for deferment is entered into, the employer 
buys the stocks in his own name and thus will have the stock 
available to discharge his responsibility for deferred compensation 
at a future date. The agreement may also provide that he will pay 
additional shares to the employee, based on the purchase by him 
annually at a stated date of shares of the stock in question, the 
number of shares being equivalent to a stated sum of money 
representing the amount of compensation intended to be deferred 
annually. One burden on the employer will still exist: he will not 
be able to take a deduction for the amount invested until payment 
is actually made to the employee; also, he will certainly have 
taxable dividend income from the stock during the period prior 
to payment since he has full ownership. Moreover, when he pays 
the stock over to the employee he will have capital gain as to any 
increase in value. These disadvantages may well be offset in large 
part by the circumstance that when the stock is turned over to the 
employee the employer will have a deduction for compensation to 
its full market value. 
It was once feared that adverse tax consequences might result if 
the employer put these stocks in a reserve-not a trust or its equiva-
lent-on his books. This issue was presented in Example 2 of the 
ruling and resolved in the negative. 
Still another refinement for the benefit of the employee is 
illustrated in the ruling. Under Example 2, after the employer 
put money into a special account and invested it, the earnings from 
the account were credited to the account. Thus both the com-
pensation and earnings from it were deferred. [However, the in-
come from the account would be taxed to the employer, as noted 
above.] 
Payment to the employee was made contingent upon his re-
fraining from engaging in a competitive business. He was also 
required to be available for consultation services and retain his 
interest in the plan unencumbered. The device was ruled suf-
ficient to defer income to the employee until actual receipt of the 
payments. Thus, the employer in effect set up a non-qualified 
pension plan for these employees, without creating income to 
them at the time the arrangement was set up. Of course the con-
sequences are in many respects less desirable than if the plan were 
qualified under Internal Revenue Code, section 401 ff.: 
I. The employer cannot take a deduction for the amounts 
payable to the employees until they are actually paid; 
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2. The employees rely only upon the general credit of the 
employer to protect their rights to payment; 
3. As the income arises in the account, it is taxed to the em-
ployer as received since it is his to do with as he desires.20 
Taxpayers should note two features of the plan reflected in 
Example 2; absence of either might cause deferment of tax to the 
employee to be lost. 
1. The interest of the employee in the payments was actually 
conditional. Normally it is not necessary (as seen in Example 1) 
to make payments conditional; yet the Commissioner might con-
clude that where the employer was setting up an informal reserve 
he could do this only where payment to the employee was not 
vested. It must be conceded that this appears only possible rather 
than probable, but the ruling is ambiguous on the point. 
2. The parties were explicit that merely an informal reserve 
account but not a trust was involved. Of course if a formal trust 
were used, the device would probably have the catastrophic con-
sequences noted earlier in these comments: either income would 
be attributed at once to the employee or the employer would lose 
his deduction altogether. 
There is another danger where a corporate employer puts sub-
stantial sums into a reserve to insure that funds are available to 
discharge obligations of the corporation under deferred compensa-
tion arrangements. Internal Revenue Code, section 531 imposes a 
special tax ranging from 27½ percent to 38½ percent with respect 
to earnings which are accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of 
a corporate business. Where a corporation establishes reserves for 
payments under deferred compensation arrangements to persons 
who are not shareholders of the corporation, no problems with 
respect to Internal Revenue Code, section 531 would be expected 
since such reserves are relevant to the reasonable needs of the 
business; that is, for payment of indebtedness for past services. 
29 This result is particularly interesting when it is compared with the provisions of 
Treas. Reg. § 1.402 (b)-1 (a) (I) (1956) and Rev. Rul. 57-37, 1957•1 CUM. BULL. 18, as modi• 
fied by Rev. Rul. 57-528, 1957-2 CuM. BuLL. 263. These provide in substance that payments 
to a trust which did not qualify as a pension or profit-sharing trust under INT. REv. CODE OF 
1954, § 401 would constitute income to the employee when payment was made to the trust 
notwithstanding that he could not get the money until a later date. Obviously the examples 
considered in Rev. Rul. 60-31 were conceived with the primary objective of avoiding 
regulations of this type. The effort was successful. It was recited at Rev. Rul. 60-31 that 
"under all of the facts and circumstances of [Examples l and 2] no trusts for the benefit 
of the taxpayers were created and no contributions are to be made thereto. Consequently, 
Section 402 (b) of the Code and § 1.402 (b)-1 (a) (1) of the regulations are inapplicable." 
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However, if extensive reserves of this kind are set up for the benefit 
of an officer and employee who is also a very substantial stockholder 
in the corporation, the Commissioner may attack the proposed 
funding on the ground that it is not required by the reasonable 
needs of the business since there is no arm's-length dealing between 
stockholders and the corporation. Potential dangers in this area 
are illustrated in Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner.30 Of 
course each case on this subject turns to an exceptional extent on 
its own facts and the danger will not be great in all cases. The 
factor, however, should not be overlooked. 
Critique of the Ruling 
Every student of our tax structure knows that nothing is easier 
than to criticize statutes and rulings of the legislative and admin-
istrative branch of government; on the other hand, nothing is more 
difficult than to suggest practicable and logical alternative solutions. 
The present ruling with respect to informal deferred compensation 
arrangement is an apt illustration. The conclusion reached, and 
the manner in which it was made, are characteristic of administra-
tive determinations made by the Service since its inception. How-
ever, they may fairly raise a question whether the ruling did not 
go too far, and whether the system may not be improved. 
Retention of Some Restrictions. In some respects previous 
safeguards with respect to deferred compensation arrangements are 
not disturbed by the ruling. For example, it is still clear that de-
ferred compensation arrangements will not be approved by the 
Internal Revenue Service in the following situations: 
1. Payment is made by an employer on behalf of an employee 
in escrow to a person who makes deferred payments to the em-
ployee thereafter. In substance the treatment here is the same as 
though the payments had been made in trust; by analogy to statutes 
applying to trusts for unqualified pension plans, income would be 
attributed to the employee at the time payment was made to the 
escrow agent. 
2. Where a joint venturer in a business enterprise receives 
profits which he holds for another joint venturer in an attempt to 
defer income to the other, the income is attributed to the true 
owner at the time it is received by the other participant. 
30 251 F,2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958). 
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One further observation should be made with respect to re-
strictive elements of the ruling. It is recited that each case must 
be determined upon its own facts, and that no advance rulings will 
be given with respect to informal deferred compensation payments. 
Thus, it is made clear by the Internal Revenue Service that tax.-
payers still come into this area at some risk, and that no safe conduct 
on specific facts will be given. 
Dubious Conclusion Respecting Deferred Income for Authors. 
The ruling with respect to authors furnishes a fertile source of 
subjects for tax philosophers of the "where will it all end" school. 
To illustrate the uncertain scope of the ruling, let us assume 
that A owns a building suitable for use as a department store and 
leases it to B for sums to be computed by reference to B's gross or 
net income from his store. However, the lease also provides that 
if the lease payments would otherwise amount to more than $5,000 
a year, the lessee is required to set the excess aside for payments to 
the lessor after the lease expired, in the same manner as the royalty 
arrangements in the example given in the ruling. 
Would deferment be approved? Possibly not, but it is very 
difficult to see a distinction between the cases. 
There are other questions. Suppose T, an attorney, works for 
six months on a case and has such a successful termination of the 
litigation that he earns a fee of $30,000. He is .on the cash basis 
and would like to have the fee spread over several years; he cannot 
spread the fee over back years because he did no work then and 
hence cannot qualify for the advantageous treatment afforded 
under section 1301. The client is willing to spread payment. 
Should it be said that the attorney has income of $30,000 in the 
year the services were rendered where the client actually pays him 
over a period of years? 
In the first place, the regulations would attribute the income 
to him if it were credited to his account or set aside for him.31 
Assume, however, that he just tells the client to pay him the money 
in five equal installments, and the money is never set aside in any 
sense. There is then no constructive receipt under the regulation, 
and it is certainly arguable that such a deferred compensation ar-
rangement should be approved. 
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (a) (1957). Note that this appears inconsistent with and 
may be overruled by Examples 1 and 2 of the Ruling, in which the employer put funds 
representing deferred compensation in a separate account for the employee. 
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It cannot be said, however, that this course is without danger. 
If a man has constructive receipt of interest because he can reach 
out and take it, but fails to do so, 32 courts may be inclined to say 
that an attorney who can collect a fixed fee from a client but fails 
to do so likewise has constructive receipt of income. (However, it 
should be remembered that the ruling makes it clear that the mere 
fact that a debtor was willing to pay the creditor at an earlier date 
is not relevant in determining the success of a deferred compensa-
tion arrangement.33) 
How might T best avoid the danger of constructive receipt in 
these circumstances? In the first place, he should be sure that 
there was no trust imposed on the fee. This would create im-
mediate tax consequences to the client in any kind of deferred 
compensation arrangement, as the ruling makes clear. Secondly, 
he assuredly could avoid receipt-even if he were on the accrual 
basis-if he and the client did not set a final fee for the services but 
the client merely paid him sums on account. (It may be under-
stood that practicability of this course is doubtful.) Assuming that 
the amount was not fixed except as to sums actually agreed upon 
and paid annually, there could be no income. 
Another way of postponing income would appear to be to 
make the payment conditional. A conditional obligation can 
scarcely create income because the potential recipient has no vested 
right in it: he must r~frain from serving others, giving advisory 
services or the like to earn the money at the later date.34 The 
practicability of this device is likewise-at a minimum-doubtful. 
32 Interest is said to constitute income to a cash basis taxpayer as soon as it is available. 
Alexander Zolotoff, 41 B.T .A. 991 (1940); Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 38 B.T.A. 960 (1938). 
[Under Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (b) (1957) an exception is made where it is shown that no 
funds for payment of interest were available.] The same conclusion has been reached 
with respect to matured bond coupons, even though the taxpayer was physically unable 
to clip and cash the coupons on the day the interest became available. Loose v. United 
States, 74 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1934); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (b) (1957). This regulation also 
provides with respect to corporate payments to its security holders (including shareholders) 
that " ••• if the amount of ... interest is not available for the shareholders' free and 
unrestricted use at the time credited, such amount is not constructively received and does 
not constitute income to the shareholder until the taxable year in which the amount is 
available." It also provides: "Interest on savings bank deposits is income to the de-
positor when credited on the books of the bank, even though the bank has a rule, seldom 
or never enforced, that it may require a certain number of days' notice before withdrawals 
are permitted. Generally, the amount of dividends or interest credited to shareholders of 
organizations such as building and loan associations or cooperative banks, is income to 
the shareholders for the taxable year when credited." 
33 See note 17 supra. 
34 Indeed Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (a) (1957) recites that there is no constructive receipt 
if taxpayer's control is "subject to substantial limitations or restrictions." 
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There is still another problem. Suppose a publisher set up on 
his own books an account for the author; that is, he segregated the 
funds. This might run afoul of the regulation attributing con-
structive receipt where property is set aside for the ultimate re-
cipient. In the author-publisher case in the ruling it ·was em-
phasized that the publisher was not authorized to segregate the 
sums 1n any manner. 
Certainly this portion of the ruling is bound to invite experi-
mentation on the part of tax counsel. There is no logical reason 
why deferment of salary should be easier than deferment of fees, 
rents, royalties, interest or other income from property. A ruling 
recognizing the propriety of deferment of royalties, coupled with 
the alternative methods of insuring successful tax deferment dis-
cussed in the preceding paragraphs, is bound to stimulate activity 
throughout the entire spectrum of income items, to the probable 
embarrassment of tax administration. 
Failure To Integrate Ruling With Other Types of 
Deferred Compensation 
One critical factor which a student attempting to evaluate this 
ruling must remember is that informal deferred compensation is 
only a part of the entire treatment of deferred compensation ar-
rangements. With this in mind, it should be noted that the ruling 
represents substantial concessions in legitimizing taxpayer devices 
with respect to informal deferred compensation which formerly 
had been dubious. 
I. It is clear that informal deferred compensation devices will 
be effective to postpone income until the sums are actually re-
ceived by the employee, even in cases where postponement of such 
payment is not subject to conditions (such as that the employee 
will not compete with the employer, or will render consultative 
services, and the like). 
2. It is now clear that the mere circumstance that the employer 
might willingly have made an earlier payment is irrelevant. (This 
had been thought to be the law previously; the ruling seems to 
make it explicit.) 
3. In at least some cases (such as the Oates case) deferred com-
pensation arrangements may be made even after earlier arrange-
ments calling for payment on a specific earlier date have been 
crystallized. 
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4. Deferred compensation arrangements with respect to income 
from royalties (possibly including income from sale of literary 
property) are approved. It is not possible to tell whether this 
ruling would extend to deferment of rentals and interest. Still less 
is it possible to tell the extent, if any, to which the ruling will apply 
profits from the sale of property generally. It seems safe to assume 
that the ruling was intended to be limited, but the scope of the 
ruling is not drawn with certainty. 
5. An employer now is permitted in informal deferred com-
pensation arrangements to-in effect-fund deferred compensation 
reserves on his books, investing the proceeds paid to the appropriate 
accounts in securities or other investments which will protect the 
employee who is to be the ultimate recipient from inflation. 
It may well be questioned whether this expansion of permissible 
devices for informal deferred compensation is ·wise in view of the 
general statutes which authorize certain tax advantages in deferred 
compensation cases under Internal Revenue Code, section 401 ff. 
The legislative history behind those statutes and the statutes them-
selves reflect the view that benefits of deferment should be gen-
erally available to substantial segments of the working staff of the 
employer without discrimination among the members of the 
group with respect to contributions received by them or their 
obligation to contribute. The statute further requires that an 
entire deferred pension plan be set up in considerable detail with 
absolute payments to be made to the plan by the employer, which 
under no circumstances may be returned to him. 
As distinguished from this statutory structure, we now have a 
combination of judicial pronouncements and administrative 
rulings under which deferment of compensation is authorized 
in far different circumstances. In the plans now expanded by the 
ruling an employer can select whomsoever he pleases to receive 
benefits of deferred compensation; he can choose several persons 
and discriminate in any manner between them; he is not only not 
required but is forbidden to make payments into a trust fund or 
use a similar device so that the employee can rely on something 
more than the mere general credit of the employer. (It is true 
that under informal deferred compensation arrangements an em-
ployee who ultimately receives payment cannot get capital gain 
treatment of his deferred compensation, as he might if he received 
such payments through a qualified plan under Internal Revenue 
Code, section 403 (a), and that a deduction of the employer under 
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the informal plan is deferred until payment is actually made to the 
employee.) 
The informal deferred compensation arrangements now en-
couraged by the ruling may be compared with still another device 
authorized at Internal Revenue Code, section 421 under which 
stock options are given to executives. These are like informal 
deferred compensation arrangements in that tax benefits are avail-
able whether they are given with or without discrimination to those 
whom the corporation desires to benefit. Here, as in the case of 
pension plans, compensation is deferred and, when received, is 
taxed at capital gain rates. Of course, in the stock option device 
(Int. Rev. Code,§ 421) the employer gets no deduction for the ad-
ditional compensation given to the employee; in deferred com-
pensation arrangements such a deduction is available. Conse-
quently, it may be expected that the ruling will tend to shift 
executive compensation devices away from stock options and over 
toward informal deferred compensation. 
Summary 
This ruling is like other rulings of general application, regu-
lations, and statutes, in the sense that it sets permissible limits 
respecting the tax consequences of various types of transactions. 
It is like other rulings also in that it doubtless resulted from 
strong taxpayer (and perhaps congressional) pressures. Certainly 
it may reasonably be argued that the ruling is subject to criticism: 
as necessarily follows in many cases of this kind it may raise at least 
as many questions as it has answered, and perhaps it goes too far in 
authorizing alternative methods of tax deferment to those spe-
cifically outlined by statute with respect to pension plans and stock 
options. 
As to these points, however, subjective views of the propriety 
of the ruling are of relatively minor concern. Its major significance 
lies in a deep-seated malaise current in all tax legislation and inter-
pretation, past and present: Congress, courts, administrators and 
the public are still drifting, dreaming and hoping that a rational 
.approach to tax legislation and administration will come to us. 
For it must be clear that we do not here merely measure, for ex-
.ample, the scope of the doctrine of constructive receipt. Whatever 
the effect of citing cases and regulations may be, the effect of the 
TUling obviously is-on a policy basis-to expand the scope of per-
missible arrangements for deferring compensation in order to 
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secure tax savings. We see here again a refusal to recognize fairly 
and openly that tax results are not shaped by legal dogma but are 
decided day to day on the basis of such social, economic and political 
pressures as are brought to that branch of government which makes 
the decision. The major fault of this ruling is the fault of decisions 
in general in tax matters: a refusal to express the motivation for the 
decision in terms of basic-not legalistic-requirements of our tax-
ing system. 
In short, this is a policy decision, but where is the policy? To 
find the answer, at least these questions must be answered: 
I. Did the representatives of the Service simply get weary 
of resisting taxpayers' pressures? 
2. Is there a sound basis, social, fiscal or economic, for ex-
panding an alternative for deferred compensation to those 
given by statute? 
3. If so, what is the basis? 
4. On what basis is the line between permissible and pro-
hibited expansion of the device to be drawn? 
Answers to such questions should be given us by Congress 
when laws are ·written, by administrators when rulings and regula-
tions are adopted, and by courts who often substitute conceptualism 
for a discussion of the realities of tax administration. 
We cannot change overnight, but change we must. In the case 
at hand, if it was decided by personnel of the Internal Revenue 
Service that its position was right but could not practicably be sup-
ported in the courts, ideally the Service should have so stated, with-
drawn from its previous position, and sought legislation. If it was 
decided that their position was ·wrong and that they should with-
draw from it, ideally they should have explained why they with-
drew. Until explanations of this sort are made by the Service (and 
until Committee Reports of Congress include a rational justifica-
tion for the law in terms of tax economics and social requirements) 
taxing statutes, regulations and rulings can hardly rise above a 
congeries of compromises. 
The nature of democracy is that an uneasy accord must some-
times be made between what is just and what is possible. This we 
cannot avoid, but if we are ever to put tax law to the level of adopt-
ing what is logical, workable and fair, we cannot fall below a 
minimum standard of boldness. Those who make our laws and 
those who interpret them by regulation, ruling, and decision must 
be courageous enough to acknowledge and defend the factors which 
402 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
motivate their policy decisions. When a pattern for this conduct 
is established, a long step forward will be taken toward bringing 
our tax structure back to a realistic, fair and logical adjustment of 
the burden of each citizen to support his government. It must 
now be clear that this result can never be reached by piling pallia-
tive upon palliative, long retreats upon short advances, and the 
traditional silence respecting basic policy decisions of all branches 
of government controlling the day-to-day adjustment of our taxing 
statutes. 
